Page:The guilt of William Hohenzollern.djvu/124

120 Russian policy, and that the Russian, although fond of brandishing his sword, is not, at the decisive moment, fond of drawing it for others."

If, however, things turned out differently, the demand for the "localization" of the war still afforded great advantages. It could only fail through Russia's claims, so that one stood before the world, or at least before one's own people, as the Power that had wanted peace—and hereby had encountered Russia's resistance. Now it was attempted to denounce this Power as the disturber of the peace.

The demand for the localization of the war was another factor that required the strictest concealment of the understanding between Germany and Austria. For it is clear that Germany could not declare that the whole conflict concerned only Austria and Serbia, to the exclusion of every other Power, when she herself had co-operated most energetically in the preparation of this conflict.

We see that both Germany and Austria had every reason to hide from the world their co-operation, from the Potsdam decisions on July 5th down to the delivery of the Ultimatum in Belgrade on July 23rd.

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THE SABOTAGE OF THE PEACE EFFORTS
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It was not easy to appear seriously concerned about the peace and, at the same time, to secure Austria "her" war with Serbia, as also to " localize " it—i.e., to place before Russia the alternative, either to declare war on Austria or to submit to her without a struggle.

The chief thing to be done was not to allow the