Page:The guilt of William Hohenzollern.djvu/104

100 Russia might soonest be brought "peaceably" to her knees. Should she, however, offer unexpected resistance the best prospects of success, also in a military sense, were to be found in leaving the enemy as little time as possible to make preparations.

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THE HOODWINKING OF EUROPE
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In all circumstances public opinion had to be lulled to sleep until the moment had arrived. This was not so simple. Foreign countries were to be reassured, while, simultaneously, the home population was to be worked up into the mood for war, which was absolutely indispensable if their actions were not to be crippled from the outset. And, on the other hand, neither of the two allies seems to have really trusted the other. Each scented "slackness" in the other, unless energetically goaded by the Press.

This occasioned many an edifying statement. Thus, on July 18th, Jagow telegraphed to Tschirschky: ""To-morrow the Norddeutsche will publish some comments on the Austro-Serbian dispute, which are couched in intentionally mild terms in consideration of European diplomacy. This markedly semi-official organ must not sound a premature alarm. Please see that this is not falsely interpreted as German deviation from determination shown there.""

Before this already, on July 15th, Berchtold sent the following message to Szögyeny in Berlin:

"From this to us also undesirable delay it is