Page:The guilt of William Hohenzollern.djvu/100

96 obtained. In this way it was hoped, by a simultaneous surprise-attack and declaration of war, to preserve the world's peace.

This was a singular kind of peace-policy, and yet the German White Book of July, 1919, still dares to assert the peaceful intentions of the Imperial Government.

These peaceful intentions are supposed to be shown by the fact that the possibility of a war with Russia was considered, but the probability of a general war was not reckoned with.

The Government even hoped that Russia would again allow herself to be intimidated, as in former Balkan crises, when taken completely by surprise, faced by a fait accompli, and no hope of the other party giving way. For the rest, they trusted to luck.

On July 28th Baron Beyens reported from Berlin:

"In Vienna, as in Berlin, despite the official assurances but recently exchanged between the Tsar and Poincaré concerning the complete equipment of the armies of the Dual Alliance, it was firmly believed that Russia was not in a position to wage a European war and would not dare to involve herself in so terrible an adventure. The disquieting internal situation, revolutionary machinations, inadequate equipment, poor transport facilities—all these grounds would compel Russia to look on impotently at the execution of Serbia. The same poor opinion was held, if not of the French Army, yet of the spirit prevailing in the Government circles of France. ...

"The opinion that Russia was not equal to a European war prevailed not only in the heart of