Page:The ethics of Aristotle.djvu/211

 Communities, and legislators seem to be more anxious to secure it than Justice even. I mean, Unanimity is somewhat like to Friendship, and this they certainly aim at and specially drive out faction as being inimical.

Again, where people are in Friendship Justice is not required; but, on the other hand, though they are just they need Friendship in addition, and that principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of the nature of Friendship.

Lastly, not only is it a thing necessary but honourable likewise: since we praise those who are fond of friends, and the having numerous friends is thought a matter of credit to a man; some go so far as to hold, that “good man” and “friend” are terms synonymous.

Yet the disputed points respecting it are not few: some men lay down that it is a kind of resemblance, and that men who are like one another are friends: whence come the common sayings, “Like will to like,” “Birds of a feather,” and so on. Others, on the contrary, say, that all such come under the maxim, “Two of a trade never agree.”

Again, some men push their inquiries on these points higher and reason physically: as Euripides, who says,

Heraclitus, again, maintains, that “contrariety is expedient, and that the best agreement arises from things differing, and that all things come into being in the way of the principle of antagonism.”

Empedocles, among others, in direct opposition to these, affirms, that “like aims at like.”

These physical questions we will take leave to omit, inasmuch as they are foreign to the present inquiry; and we will examine such as are proper to man and concern moral characters and feelings: as, for instance, “Does Friendship arise among all without distinction, or is it impossible for