Page:The autobiography of a Pennsylvanian.djvu/140

 reason was that I feared that through lack of skill and experience upon my part some innocent person might be convicted and punished. In pursuing this course I made a mistake, since, except in cases of popular clamor to which timid juries and judges yield, the chances of the conviction of innocence are very slight.

At a dinner, October 1, 1888, Justice Miller, of the Supreme Court of the United States, gave such an interesting narrative of a crisis in American history that I wrote it out in full at the time, as follows:

October 1, 1888. To-day Justice Samuel F. Miller of the Supreme Court of the United States delivered the opening address to the law class of the University of Pennsylvania, and at seven o'clock he sat down to a dinner at the Rittenhouse Club, No. 1811 Walnut Street, tendered to him by the faculty of the law department of the University. There were at the dinner C. Stuart Patterson, George Harding, Wayne MacVeagh, Dr. William Pepper, Judge T. K. Finletter, Samuel W. Pennypacker, Dr. Jayne, Judge Henry Reed, A. Sydney Biddle, Judge William Butler, Morton P. Henry, Judge James T. Mitchell, George Tucker Bispham, Justice Miller, Richard C. McMurtrie, Judge William McKenna.

After the wine had to some extent enlivened the party the turn taken by the conversation made it a most interesting event. The Justice said that during the war the most strenuous efforts were made to use the court in such a way as to embarrass the Government in its conduct of operations by endeavoring to get decisions upon such questions as the right of Mr. Seward to confine obnoxious persons in the forts, the right of Mr. Stanton to confiscate the property of citizens in the rebellious states, etc. One lawyer from Mississippi spent about two years in endeavoring, in various ways, to get a decision upon some case of this kind. Once upon an application to advance a habeas corpus case the court seemed inclined to take the action. The Justice took occasion to see a friend of Justice Nelson and tell him that it would depend upon how Nelson voted as to whether the case should be advanced upon the list, and since it was a matter simply of the methods and administration of the business of the court, it did not seem improper to talk to him about its effect on public affairs. Nelson afterward voted against the advancement. The Justice did more to prevent interference by the court than 130