Page:The World and the Individual, Second Series (1901).djvu/73

48 emotions of each pair resemble each other in being of the same more special types. Wills can differ or conflict by virtue of their relation to the same objects. On the other hand, where points of difference between objects multiply until we no longer recognize the correlative agreements, the objects in question become disparate for our consciousness. And disparity means at once the possession of so many differences that we can no longer recognize what they are, and a kind of secondary appearance of vague likenesses; since all objects whose relations we cannot clearly make out tend to lapse into a sort of blur in the background of our consciousness. There are countless differences amongst the miscellaneous objects that one sees in a crowded market-place, in case he himself is not seeking for the wares, or caring for the buyers and sellers. One observes that these differences are in one sense endless. One also observes that all this seems much alike to him; because it all means crowd and confusion, and leaves him “indifferent.”

Herewith, however, we come to a point in the theory of our consciousness of likeness and difference which is, in my opinion, of critical importance for our whole doctrine about the particular facts of the world, and for our final interpretation of the problem of the individual. The likenesses and differences that we observe in facts are not merely thrust upon us without our consent or connivance. They are the objects of our attentive Interest. And they obviously vary with this interest. Nowhere more clearly than in case of our consciousness of likeness and difference do we see how significant the will is in determining what we shall regard as actual.