Page:The World and the Individual, Second Series (1901).djvu/108

Rh object appears, as in our present sense, between the two others, then we have the first beginning of a single series of distinctions. And the rule of our discriminating intelligence is that, while the problem of the One and the Many is hopelessly baffling if we deal merely with two terms, and while it is equally hopeless so long as we deal with an indefinite number of objects not arranged in series, we begin to see the light so soon as we get one of our objects between the two others, and so begin to form a series possessing a definite character and direction. And by "direction" we here mean, not spatial or temporal direction, but direction of logical dependence.

And now why does this getting of one object between two others help us? I point out that the generalized definition of the relation between, which we owe to Mr. Kempe, suggests at once the answer to this question. I can comprehend the relation of One and Many just in so far, and only in so far, as I observe the unity of my own purpose demanding, itself of itself, a variety of expression. Now, when I discriminate, I at first find the fact