Page:The World and the Individual, First Series (1899).djvu/558

Rh least, by hypothesis, trying to make, this supposition. For unless the supposition is really attempted, there is no conception of F in question at all. But if the supposition is itself a fact, then, at that instant, when the supposition is made, the world of Being contains at least two facts, namely, F, and your supposition about F. Call the supposition f; and symbolize the universe by U. Then the least possible universe that can exist, at the moment when your hypothesis is made, will be such that U = F + f.

Having proceeded so far, however, we cannot stop. As we saw in analyzing the realistic concept, Realism hopelessly endeavors to assert that, although what we now call F and f are alike real, they have no essential relations to each other. For our present purpose, however, we need only note that whether or no the relations of F and f are in the least essential to the being of either F or f, taken in themselves, still, when F and f are once together and related, the relations are at least as real as their terms. Or, even if we confine ourselves strictly to our symbols, it remains obviously true that in order merely to report the supposed facts, we had to write, as the actual constitution of our universe, at least F + f. Now this universe, as thus symbolized, has not merely a twofold, but a threefold constitution. It consists of F, and of f, and of their +, i.e. of the relation, as real as both of them, which we try to regard as non-essential to the Being of either of them, but which, for that very reason, has to be something wholly other than themselves, just as they are supposed to be different from each other. A system such as Herbart’s depends, indeed, upon trying to reduce this + to a Zufällige Ansicht, which is supposed, for that reason, to be no part of the realm of the “reals.” But, in answer to any such effort, we must stubbornly insist (and here in entire agreement with Mr. Bradley) upon declaring that either this Zufällige Ansicht stands for a real fact, for something which is, or else the whole hypothesis falls to the ground. For the essence of the hypothesis is that, f rightly supposes F to exist, or, in other words, that the relation between F and f is one of genuine reference,