Page:The World and the Individual, First Series (1899).djvu/255

236 And what are these new objects? Kant tells us in a very explicit way. They are the objects of Mögliche Erfahrung, of Possible Experience. The natural sciences are busy with these objects. The latter do not depend upon our will. They are plainly independent of our private individuality. But they are dependent upon the constitution of our experience.

For our experience, — that is, Kant’s supposed discovery, — has, quite apart from any things in themselves, its own universal and fixed constitution. It is like a well bounded island in the ocean of mystery. The simile is Kant’s. It is like a well ordered state, whose constitution and laws predetermine those facts, such as debts and credits, or such as ranks and social status, — those facts of which we earlier made mention in this discussion. Were it not for this universal constitution of our experience, our momentary opinions would wander like the nomads to whom Kant compares the sceptics in philosophy. As it is, the understanding gives law to nature. Universal assertions are valid. Science is possible.

We have no concern here with the manner in which Kant undertook to define how experience won this, its constitution. Enough, the universality is for him there. And as a result, if you ask whether there are inhabitants in the moon, Kant holds that you are not rightly inquiring about any sort of absolutely independent real beings, for in science you have no business with realistic beings of any sort. The things in themselves exist, but you can never win any sort of idea about them. On the other hand, in thus questioning, you are indeed asking a perfectly fair scientific question, and one in no wise relating