Page:The World's Most Famous Court Trial - 1925.djvu/64

 cause they are the supreme head of the schools, and they can regulate the schools as any other part of the regulations might be had. They can pass the law under the inherent powers vested in them, and that has nothing to do with the police powers.

Taking up another exception or two, the right of religious worship, "that all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience," that seems to me as perfectly ridiculous to say when a state employs a teacher, and he is employed under men appointed by the legislature by their acts, it is perfectly ridiculous to me to think that when they employ that teacher that he can go in and teach any kind of doctrine he wants to teach, and yet be violating that act of free speech, but they say they cannot do that, it would be violating it, if they did. Suppose a teacher wanted to teach architecture in a school when he has been employed to teach mathematics. Suppose he is employed to teach arithmetic to the class which the uniform textbook commission has adopted, and by the way, the uniform textbook commission, as Your Honor knows, has been established by the legislature. Suppose that instead of teaching arithmetic this teacher wants to teach architecture. Un- [sic] It is perfectly ridiculous to think der [sic] their argument they say that architecture—under his rights of free speech that a man can teach architecture instead of arithmetic. they [sic] cannot control him and make him teach that arithmetic in that school. They go on and say that his religious worship is hindered thereby. The teaching in the schools has nothing whatever to do with religious worship, and as Mr. McKenzie brought out, he can preach as he wants to on the streets—his religious rights—but cannot preach them in school. I think that about covers all their exceptions that are worth while to mention.

The Court—Have you a copy of that brief for the state?

Mr. Hicks—Yes, sir, we can get it for you, Your Honor.

Court—Well, I will see it later. Any other counsel? Mr. Haggard? Gen. Stewart?

Gen. Stewart—Yes, sir.

Court—If you gentlemen would prefer the court will now adjourn for dinner in about twenty-five minutes.

Gen. Stewart—It is ten minutes after eleven according to my time.

Court—The court will adjourn at 11:30 and I wouldn't want to break into your argument.

Gen. Stewart—Well, I couldn't finish in twenty minutes. It will take thirty or forty minutes, I think. Of course, I want to read some authorities.

The Court—Well, I want to say to both sides, gentlemen, these issues are too profound for the court to guess at. I want briefs from both sides. If you have briefs I want you to file them with me. If you haven't any briefs, I will ask that you prepare them hurriedly.

Mr. Neal—May it please Your Honor, we had contemplated that possibility—especially Mr. Hays more than myself—we had contemplated that these proceedings would be more or less informal.

Mr. Hays—We will promise Your Honor to furnish the brief.

Mr. Neal—We contemplated the brief will come later. We contemplated your decision coming later, but if your decision is coming now we will very quickly have in your hands the brief.

Court—Any one else for the state besides Gen. Stewart? Anyone else to argue besides you?

Gen. Stewart—No, sir; that is all we will have. I want to make a few—

Court—Except you?

Gen. Stewart—I wanted to argue a little.

Court—I say, except you.

Gen. Stewart—That is all except I wanted to make an argument on the proposition.

Court—I said any other lawyer except you. The defense seems possibly to have misconstrued the procedure and I wouldn't want to break into your argument, so having