Page:The Works of John Locke - 1823 - vol 01.djvu/287

Ch. 17. and evident: the idea of empty pure space, whether within or beyond the confines of all bodies, being exactly the same, differing not in nature, though in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it. So that wherever the mind places itself by any thought, either amongst or remote from all bodies, it can in this uniform idea of space nowhere find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily conclude it, by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite.

§ 5. As by the power we find in ourselves of repeating, as often as we will, duration. any idea of space, we get the idea of immensity; so, by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds with all the endless addition of number, we come by the idea of eternity. For we find in ourselves, we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas than we can come to the end of number, which every one perceives he cannot. But here again it is another question, quite different from our having an idea of eternity, to know whether there were any real being, whose duration has been eternal. And as to this, I say, he that considers something now existing, must necessarily come to something eternal. But having spoke of this in another place, I shall say here no more of it, but proceed on to some other considerations of our idea of infinity.

§ 6. If it be so, that our idea of infinity be got from the power we observe in ourselves of repeating without end our own capable of ideas; it may be demanded, "why we do not attribute infinite to other ideas, as well as those of space and duration;" since they may be as easily and as often repeated in our minds as the other; and yet nobody ever thinks of infinite sweetness, or infinite whiteness, though he can repeat the idea of sweet or white as frequently as those of a yard, or a day? To which I answer, all the ideas that are considered as having parts, and are capable of increase