Page:The Works of John Locke - 1823 - vol 01.djvu/22

xvi. That well-known chapter of Power has been termed the worst part of his whole Essay, and seems indeed the least defensible, and what gave himself the least satisfaction, after all the pains he and others took to reform it; [v. letters between him and Molyneux and Limborch. To which may be added note 45 to King's Or. of E. p. 220, 4th edit.] which might induce one to believe that this most intricate subject is placed beyond human reach; since so penetrating a genius confesses his inability to see through it. And happy are those inquirers who can discern the extent of their faculties! who have learnt in time where to stop and suspend a positive determination! "If you will argue," says he, for or against liberty from consequences, "I will not undertake to answer you; for I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, yet I cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to; and therefore I have long left off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion: that, if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free; though I see not the way of it." Letter to M. Jan. 20, 169⅔.

13. Connected in some sort with the fore-mentioned Essay, and in their way equally valuable, are his tracts on Education and the early Conduct of the Understanding, both worthy, as we apprehend, of a more careful perusal than is commonly bestowed upon them, the latter more especially, which seems to be little known, and less attended to. It contains an easy popular illustration of some discoveries in the foregoing Essay, particularly that great and universal law of nature, the support of so many mental powers, (v. g. that of memory under all its modifications) and