Page:The Works of John Locke - 1823 - vol 01.djvu/101

Ch. 2. But since no proposition can be innate, unless the ideas, about which it is, be innate; this will be, to suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, taste, figure, &c. innate, than which there cannot be any thing more opposite to reason and experience. Universal and ready assent, upon hearing and understanding the terms,is (I grant) a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, depending not on innate impressions, but on something else (as we shall show hereafter), belongs to several propositions, which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

§ 19. Nor let it be said, that those more particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as, that one and two are equal to three; that green is not red, &c.; are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions, which are looked on as innate principles; since any one, who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding, will certainly find, that these, and the like less general propositions, are certainly known, and firmly assented to, by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing.

§ 20. If it be said, that "these propositions, viz. two and two are equal to four; red is not blue, &c.; are not general maxims, nor of any great use;" I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent, upon hearing and understanding: for, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever proposition can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate proposition, as well as this maxim, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that