Page:The Works of Francis Bacon (1884) Volume 1.djvu/575

 FABLE OF CUPID f or so he said ; &quot; What heat moreover or quanti ty, that is, what strength of heat, and what quantity of it, that is which turns, and how it turns the earth, and those things that are entities into such bodies as itself, is not to be inquired into, since we have no means of coming to this knowledge. For on what principle shall it be allowed us to distribute the strength of heat, and heat itself, as it were, into degrees, or to perceive clearly the copiousness and quantity of matter which is endowed with it, and to assign a certain quantity, disposition, and certain actions of mat ter to certain and determinate powers and co piousness of heat, or, on the contrary, to assign a fixed and certain copiousness of heat to a certain quantity and certain actions of matter: O, that this might be obtained by those who have both time and intellect at command adequate to this investigation, and who could, in the possession of the most perfect tranquillity, search into nature; that mankind might not only become then masters of every kind of knowledge, but almost of every kind of power.&quot; This, indeed, is said with more honesty than is found in his opponents, who, if they cannot attain their ob jects, affirm that their attainment is impossible from the nature of the art or object itself, so that no art can be condemned, since itself is both pleader and judge. There remains that which was the third, namely, the method of reduction. This Telesius despatches by a threefold sentence. The first is that which we noticed by the way before, that no symbolization is understood (as in the doctrine of the Peripatetics) through which substances, by an agreement, as it were, are nourished, and act in unison : for that all genera tion, and every effect in a natural body, is the result of victory and predominance, not of agree ment or treaty. This, indeed, is no new dogma, since Aristotle remarked it in the doctrine of Empedocles ; for that Empedocles, indeed, though he maintains contention and amity to be the efficient principles of things, yet in his explica tions of causes generally makes use of their contention, and seems to forget their amity. The second is, that heat by its own proper action constantly changes a substance into moisture, and that dryness by no means coalesces with heat, nor moisture with cold ; for that to attenuate and to moisten is the same, and that what is extremely thin is also extremely moist; if through humid be understood that which very easily yields, is divided into parts, again recovers itself, and is with difficuty limited or made to settle. All which are more the properties of fire than of air, which is for the most part moist, according to the Peripatetics ; and that so heat continually draws, feeds upon, extends, inserts, and generates humidity; that cold, on the contrary, acts alto gether on dryness, concretion, and hardness: where Aristotle deems him deficient in ar and inconsistent, and impatient of the ii of experience, in joining heat with dryness. For that the drying of substances by heat w accidental merely ; namely in a dissimilar body, and that is composed of some parts more, thick, of others more thin, by drawing out, and (by means of attenuation) giving vent to the thinner part, till the thicker part is forced thence, and compresses itself more; which thicker part, nevertheless, if a rather violent heat comes, flows also of itself, as is evident in bricks : for, in the first place, heat, not so fervent, makes the loam into bricks on the thinner part having evaporated ; hut a more powerful heat even dissolves that bricky substance into glass. And these two dogmata can be considered as the answers to errors; the third plainly affirms, and not only so, but clearly distinguishes the method of reduction. This is twofold, either by rejection or conversion : and one or other of these modes is brought out into act, according to the power of the heat, and the arrangement of matter. But two canons belong to this subject. The one is, that when heat and cold concur in vast bulk, and, as it were, with any even force, an ejection follows. For entities, like armies, are moved from their place and thrust forward. But when it takes place in a less quantity, then a conversion follows: for the entities are destroyed, and lose rather their nature than their place. There is a remarkable exemplification of this in the higher regions of the air, which, although they come nearer to the celestial heat, are yet found colder than the con fines of the earth. For in those regions, after arriving nearer to the seat of the prime heat, the heat, collecting itself, at once casts down, and thrusts off, and hinders from approach the whole power of the cold which had ascended. He saith that the same thing, moreover, may happen, that there may be through the depths of the earth greater heats than on the surface; to wit, after the approach to the seat of the prime cold, which rousing itself throws off the heat with great force, and avoids it, and returns into its own nature. The second canon is, that in an open body ejection in a close conversion fol lows. He asserts that, this is notably instanced in closed vessels, where the emission of an attenuated body (which we commonly call spirit) being restrained, begets deep and intrinsical alterations and fermentations in bodies; but that this takes place in like manner when a body, from its parts being compacted, is to tself like a closed vessel. Such are the opi nions of Telesius, and, perhaps, of Parme- nides, on the elements of things, excepting that Telesius added, of his own accord, Hyle. through his being led astray by the Peripatetic notions.