Page:The Works of Francis Bacon (1884) Volume 1.djvu/564

 436 FABLE OF CUPID. sions and common notions, and similar wander ings of the mind beyond the bounds of nature. This, therefore, must be constantly in the philoso pher s thoughts, that Cupid is without parents, lest perchance his understanding turn aside to empty questions; because in universal percep tions of this kind the human mind becomes dif fusive, and departs from the right use of itself and of its objects, and, whilst it tends toward things more distant, falls back upon those that are nearer. For when, through its own limited capacity, it is accustomed to be most affected by those things which occur familiarly to it, and which can enter and strike the mind suddenly ; it comes to pass that when it stretches itself toward those things which, according to experience, are for the most part universal, and, nevertheless, is unwilling to rest satisfied, then, as if desirous of something more within the reach of its know- led ge,it turns itself to those things which havemost effected or allured it, and imagines them to be more causative and palpable than those universals. Therefore, it has been now laid down that the first essence of things, or Cupid, is without a cause. We have now to inquire into the mode of this thing which is uncaused ; and the mode of it is likewise very obscure, which indeed the fable elegantly hints in Cupid being hatched beneath the brooding wing of night. So at least the in spired philosopher saith, &quot; God hath made all things beautiful in their seasons : He hath also set the Avorld in their heart, yet so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning unto the end.&quot; For the great law of essence and nature which cuts and runs through the vicissitudes of things, (which law seems to be described in the compass of the words, &quot; the work which God wrought from the beginning even to the end,&quot;) the power lodged by God in the primi tive particles, from the multiplication of which, the whole variety of things might spring forth and be composed, may indeed just strike, but cannot enter deeply the mind of man. But, that saying concerning the egg of night, is very aptly referred to those proofs by means of which our Cupid is brought to light. For those proofs which are concluded by means of affirmatives, seem to be the offspring of light; those which are concluded by means of negatives and exclusions, may be called the offspring of darkness and night : and Cupid is in truth the egg sprung from night; for all the knowledge we can gather respecting him comes by the way of negatives and exclusions. But a proof gathered by exclusions has still some degree of ignorance in it, and is a kind of night as to that which is included in it: whence Demo- critus admirably remarked, that the atoms or seeds and their properties were like nothing that fulls under the observation of sense, and held them to be of a dark and secret nature. He there fore pronounced of them, &quot;They are neither like fire, nor any other thing, the body of which is perceptible by sense, or open to the touch.&quot; And again he says of their nature, &quot; but it is requisite the elements in the work of creation, should pit forth a secret and dark nature, lest any contrarious and opposing principle arise.&quot; Therefore atoms are neither like sparks of fire, nor drops of water, nor bubbles of air, nor grains of sand, nor the minute particles of spirit or ether. Nor, is the power and form of them a something heavy or light, or hot or cold, or dense or rare, or hard or soft, as are found in larger bodies, since those powers, and the rest of that order, are compounded and wrought together. And, in like manner, the natural motion of an atom is neither that motion of descent which is called natural, nor a motion opposed to that force, nor a motion of expansion and contraction, nor of impulsion and connexion, nor the rotatory motion of the heavenly bodies, nor any other of the greater motions simply. But, notwithstanding this, in the body of an atom are the elements of all bodies, and in the nature of an atom the beginning of all motions and natural properties. But, yet, in this very point, namely, the motion of an atom as compared with the motion of greater substances, the philosophy of the parable appears to differ from that of Demo- critus. For he is not only opposed to the parable, but inconsistent, if not contradictory in his more copious assertions on this head. For he should have ascribed a heterogeneous motion to an atom not less than a heterogeneous body and power. But, he out of the motions of greater substances, has chosen two, to ascribe them as primitive motions to atoms, namely, the descent of heavy and the ascent of light bodies, (which he explained by the striking or the percussion of the more heavy, in forcing upwards the less heavy bodies.) But the parable all along preserves the heterogeneous and exclusive nature it ascribes to atoms, as well in speaking of its motion as of its substance. But the parable further intimates, that this exclusion has its limit, for night does not brood over the egg forever : and it is certainly proper to the Deity, that in our inquiry into his nature by means of the senses, exclusions should not terminate in affirmatives. And there is another reason for this, namely, that after the due exclu sions and negations, something should be affirmed and settled, and that the egg should be produced as it were by a seasonable and mature incubation ; not only that the egg should be brought forth by night, but also that the person of Cupid srjould be delivered of the egg: that is, that not only should an obscure notion upon this subject be originated, but one that is distinct. Thus much upon demon strations, as far as they can be given, upon the first matter, and I think in accordance with the parable. We come now to Cupid himself, the primitive matter and its properties, involved in so great