Page:The Works of Francis Bacon (1884) Volume 1.djvu/557

 INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. novel and surprising than fit for profit an&amp;lt;l utility. I the mind. So that if the ideas them-.-lv.-s. But even novelty has often the advantage of which are the souls of words, are vague, in&amp;lt;-&amp;lt;.n:- agitating somewhat the intricate folds of nature, ami assisting with light at least, if not with deed. JSo he saw that, neither in the opinions of the Greeks or the moderns, nor in the traditions of alchymy or natural magic, could any thing be found leading to the increase of human means. Wherefore all these should either be thrown into oblivion, or given up to the pursuit of the multi tude, while the true sons of knowledge turn their course elsewhere. He thought also that the modes of demonstra tion should be reviewed ; for demonstrations, by a certain influence, are philosophy ; and, in pro portion as they are just or faulty, complete or imperfect, doctrines will probably ensue from them. But he found that the demonstrations which are in use are neither full nor certain. Yet we should not blame the senses, as some have done. For the errors of the senses in particulars have no great effect on the sum of the sciences : not more at least than may be corrected by the rightly informed mind. But that the mind itself, if it rely on nature without art and discipline, is unequal to the matter and below it, may be pro nounced boldly. For it is neither so capacious as to admit and arrange the infinite variety of particulars necessary for information, nor so free and unbiassed as to receive true and natural impressions without some warp and colouring. Nay, it is very certain both that the human mind is generally like an uneven mirror, which re ceives and reflects the rays of objects according to the angle of each facet, and not on a plain surface; and also that every one, from his educa tion, pursuits, and constitution, is haunted with a kind of misleading power, and, as it were, familiar spirit, which mocks and disturbs the mind with various and fantastic devices. Yet we must not, therefore, fall into the opinion of incapability. For it is evident, that by no steadi ness of hand or skill of eye, however exquisite, could an exact straight line or circle be described ; yet, on applying a ruler or turning the compasses, the matter is easy. Again, in mechanical crafts the naked hand of man can work but little, yet with the aid and means of instruments it con quers alike the vastest and most minute. It follows then that we must fly to art, and must look to demonstration, which is governed by art. And sentence may be given in a few words on the syllogism which is Aristotle s oracle. It is, doubtless, a useful instrument and aid to the understanding in sciences, which are founded in human opinion, as the moral and political; but inferior and incompetent to the subtlety and obscurity of natural processes. For the syllo gism certainly consists of propositions, and the plete, and not sufficiently defined, (which is for the most part the case in nature, J the. whole sinks. Induction remains the last arid only re fuge and aid for matter; nor are our hopes placed in it undeservedly, since it can collect laborious works, and the certain evidence of facts, and lay them before the mind. But its name only is known, its power and use haa hitherto lain hid. For induction must be judged of thus; in its use and form men have erred doubly. First, that impatient of delay and searching round for short cuts, and hastening to fix some things as certain, round which as poles discussions might turn, they have only applied it to the general principles of sciences, lightly hoping to work all within by syllogistic deduc tion. Secondly, that having examined the syl logism accurately, but this demonstration hastily and carelessly, they have devised its form very simple and indeed puerile, to proceed by enume ration alone, and thus conclude precariously, not necessarily. No one, therefore, can wonder if he, with this opinion on demonstrations, does not agree on natural philosophy with others, either ancient or modern. For it cannot be, (to speak jestingly,) that the drinkers of water and wine should feel alike. For they swallow a raw fluid, either flowing spontaneously from the mind, or pumped up with some labour; but he drinks a liquor prepared from innumerable grapes, mature and in season, plucked and heaped up in bunches, afterwards squeezed in the winepress, purified in the vat, and clarified ; which will bear time, and at the same time is corrected of all intoxicating quality, by neither giving nor leaving any room for the vapours of the fancy. So he saw that the philosophies of which we have spoken should be rejected, not only for their barrenness of works, but for the weakness and fallaciousness of their demonstrations also, since they are not only re moved from nature, but deserted and betrayed by the very auxiliaries they have raised. He thought also, that we should make a sepa rate review of the modes of invention in use, if there be any. But in this quarter not so much misleading and devious paths, as solitude and vacancy, are found, which strike the mind with a kind of stupor. It has not been the object or desire of any man to guide the force of human wit and understanding to the invention and im provement of arts and&quot; sciences, and hew a roid thither; but the whole has been, and is left to the dimness of tradition, the steps and fury of argu ments, or the waves and turnings of chance and experiment. Hence, it was not without reason, that, in the temples of the Egyptians, who (aa was the custom of antiquity) used to deify proposition of words, and words are the evi- inventors, so many images of brutes wen- I mi nd ; dences and signs of ideas or conceptions of ! since animals without the light of reason have