Page:The Works of Francis Bacon (1884) Volume 1.djvu/325

 nugatory and void; because of the received and inveterate opinion, that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or true differences: of which opinion we will take this hold, that the invention of forms is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought, if it be possible to be found. As for the possibility, they are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when they can see nothing but sea. But it is manifest that Plato, in his opinion of ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff, did descry, "That forms were the true object of knowledge;" but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter; and so turning his opinion upon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected. But if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action, operation, and the use of knowledge, he may advise and take notice what are the forms, the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the state of man. For as to the forms of substances, man only except, of whom it is said, "Formavit hominem de limo terræ, et spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitæ," and not as of all other creatures, "Producant aquæ, producat terra;" the forms of substances, I say, as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied, are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired; no more than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words, which by composition and transposition of letters are infinite. But, on the other side, to inquire the lorm of those sounds or voices which make simple letters, is easily comprehensible; and being known, induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words, which consist and are compounded of them. In the same manner, to inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of which the essences, upheld by matter, of all creatures do consist; to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, is that part of metaphysic which we now define of. Not but that physic doth make inquiry, and take consideration of the same natures: but how? Only as to the material and efficient causes of them, and not as to the forms. For example; if the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus, that the subtile intermixture of air and water is the cause, it is well rendered; but nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but "vehiculum formæ." This part of metaphysic I do not find laboured and performed; whereat I marvel not: because I hold it not possible to be invented by that course of invention which hath been used; in regard that men, which is the root of all error have made too untimely a departure and too remote a recess from particulars.

But the use of this part of metaphysic, which report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects: the one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of "vita brevis, ars longa;" which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences: for knowledges are as pyramids, whereof history is the basis. So of Natural Philosophy, the basis is natural history; the stage next the basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. As for the vertical point, "Opus quod operatur Deus à principio usque ad finem," the summary law of nature, we know not whether man's inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be the true stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved no better than the giants' hills:

But to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they are as the three acclamations, "Sancte, sancte, sancte;" holy in the description or dilatation of his works; holy in the connexion or concatenation of them; and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. And therefore the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, that all things by scale did ascend to unity. So then always that knowledge is worthiest, which is charged with least multiplicity; which appeareth to be metaphysic; as that which considereth the simple forms or differences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and coordinations whereof make all this variety.

The second respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysic, is, that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For physic carrieth man in narrow and restrained ways, subject to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature; but "latæ undique sunt sapientibus viæ:"; to sapience, which was anciently defined to be "rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia," there is ever choice of means: for physical causes give light to new invention "in simili materia." But whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is less restrained in operation, either to the basis of the matter, or the condition of the efficient: which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, though in a more divine sort, elegantly describeth: "Non arctabuntur gressus tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum."