Page:The Works of Francis Bacon (1884) Volume 1.djvu/277

 ANALYSIS OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF LKAKNING. lid that flew open fur art I firry, or generally to chuncc, or am/ thing //., thin to i&amp;gt;gic, fur thf inreittion. of arts nn/l M-/V//.T.V. // i vi vt no iinrrrl, the manner of antiquity being In rnn^rrrulr inrrnlnrx, that the Egi/p- titinx had yi&amp;gt; frn&amp;lt; h niiuu idulu in their temples, but utmost till brute. Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she espied Witer, (hut the wat^r might ri*e so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a field in Jlotver, a great way off, to her hive ? Who taught the ant to bite even/ grain of corn that she huritth in her hill, last it should tuke root and grow ? . The forms of induction which logic pro pounds is defective 208 Tn conclude upon an enumeration of par ticulars, without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture ; for who can as sure, in man y subjects upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are. not other on the contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which were brought before him, and failed of David, who was absent in the field. . Allowing some axioms to be rightly in duced, middle propositions cannot be inferred from them in subject of nature by syllogism. Here was their chief error ; they charg d the deceit upon the senses,- which in my judgment, notwithstanding all their cav/lla- tions, are very sufficient to certify and report truth, though not always immediately, yet by comparison, by help of instrument, and l)if pmd icing and urging suc/i things as are too subtile for the sense, to some effect comprehen sible by the sense, and other like asuiatance. But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senxes. . Bacon s intention to propound the art of inventing arts and sciences by two modes : 1st. Experi- entia literata. 2d. Interpretatio naturae. 1 INVENTION OF SPEECH OR ARGUMENT . . 209 . It is more properly memory with application than invention. We do account it a chase, as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large. . Modes of producing this recollection: 1st. Prepa ration. 2d. Suggestion. Preparation. . It is the storing arguments on such things as are frequently discusaed. . It consists chiefly of diligence. Aristotle, said the sophists, &quot; did as if one that professed the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make a shoe, but only exhibit, in a readiness, a number of shoes of all fash ions and sizes.&quot; But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in The Experientia Literata is contained in the Treatise De Augrnentis ; and lug Interpretatio Nature constitutes his Vovuin Organ urn. /// .s- shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly cuntnnt il. Our Siirinnr, */n nliing nf divine know/edge, saith, th&amp;lt;it the kingdom of heaven is like a good househo/dt-r, that bringeth forth both new and old store. . This subject is more fully investigated under the head of rhetoric. Suggestion 209 . It directs the mind to certain marks, as a mode of exciting it to the production of acquired know ledge. . Different sorts of topics : 1. General. 2. Particular. General Suggestion. . Its uses are to furnish arguments to dispute proba bly : to minister to our judgments: to conclude right, and to direct our inquiries. A f/cully of wise interrogating is half a know/edge. For as Plato saith, &quot; Whosoever seeketh, knowelh that which he seekelh for in a general notion, else how shall he know it when he hath found it ?&quot; Particular Suggestion. . It is a direction of invention in every particular knowledge. . Ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis. In going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain the bdtir sight of that part of the way which remaine/h. Judgment 210 . It relates to the nature of proofs and demonstrations. . Different modes of judging: 1. By induction, which is referred to the Novum Organum 2. By syllogism. Of Syllogism. . Syllogisms are agreeable to the mind, and have been much laboured. The nature of man doth extremely covet tc have somewhat, in his understanding fixed, and immoveab/e, and as a rest and su/ipurt nf the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endea- voureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent, and as he elegantly ex- poundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from Jail ing, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accom plished; so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within, to keep them from fluctuation. . The art of judging by syllogism is the reduction of propositions to principles by an agreed middle term. . Syllogisms are direct, or ex absurdo. . Division of the art of judgment : 1st. The analytic art 2. The doctrine of clenches. The Analytic Art. . It is for direction. . It sets down the true form of arguments, from which any deviation leads to error. The Doctrine of Elenches 210 . It is for caution to detect fallacies. In the more gross sorts of fallacies it hap- peneth, as Seneca maketh the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which though we know N 2