Page:The Works of Francis Bacon (1884) Volume 1.djvu/232





back from your invitation at Eton, where I had refreshed myself with company which I loved, I fell into a consideration of that part of policy whereof philosophy speaketh too much and laws too little; and that is of education of youth. Whereupon fixing my mind a while, I found straightways, and noted even in the discourses of philosophers which are so large in this argument, a strange silence concerning one principal part of that subject. For as touching the framing and seasoning of youth to moral virtue, (as tolerance of labours, continency from pleasures, obedience, honour, and the like,) they handle it; but touching the improvement and helping of the intellectual powers, as of conceit, memory, and judgment, they say nothing. Whether it were that they thought it to be a matter wherein nature only prevailed; or that they intended it as referred to the several and proper arts which teach the use of reason and speech. But for the former of these two reasons, howsoever it pleaseth them to distinguish of habits and powers, the experience is manifest enough that the motions and faculties of the wit and memory may be not only governed and guided but also confirmed and enlarged by custom and exercise duly applied. As if a man exercise shooting, he shall not only shoot nearer the mark but also draw a stronger bow. And as for the latter of comprehending these precepts within the arts of logic and rhetoric, if it be rightly considered, their office is distinct altogether from this point. For it is no part of the doctrine of the use or handling of an instrument to teach how to whet or grind the instrument to give it a sharp edge, or how to quench it or otherwise whereby to give it a stronger temper. Wherefore finding this part of knowledge not broken, I have but "tanquam aliud agens" entered into it, and salute you with it, dedicating it after the ancient manner, first as to a dear friend: and then as to an apt person; for as much as you have both place to practise it, and judgment and leisure to look deeper into it, than I have done. Herein you must call to mind. Though the argument be not of great height and dignity, nevertheless it is of great and universal use; and yet I do not see why, to consider it rightly, that should not be a learning of height, which teacheth to raise the highest and worthiest part of the mind. But howsoever that be, if the world take any light and use by this writing, I will the gratulation be to the good friendship and acquaintance between us two. And so I commend you to God's divine protection.

ever hold it for an insolent and unlucky saying, "faber quisque fortunæ suæ," except it be uttered only as an hortative or spur to correct sloth. For otherwise if it be believed as it soundeth; and that a man entereth into an high imagination that he can compass and fathom all accidents; and ascribeth all successes to his drifts and reaches, and the contrary to his errors and sleepings. It is commonly seen that the evening fortune of that man is not so prosperous as of him that without slackening of his industry attributeth much to felicity and providence above him. But if the sentence were turned to this, "faber quisque ingenii sui," it were somewhat more true and much more profitable; because it would teach men to bend themselves to reform those imperfections in themselves, which now they seek but to cover; and to attain those virtues and good parts, which now they seek but to have only in show and demonstration. Yet notwithstanding every man attempteth to be of the first trade of carpenters, and few bind themselves to the second: whereas nevertheless, the rising in fortune seldom amendeth the mind; but on the other side, the removing of the stondes and impediments of the mind, doth