Page:The Works of Francis Bacon (1884) Volume 1.djvu/186

 honour are these: in the first place are "conditores imperiorum," founders of states and commonwealths; such as were Romulus, Cyrus, Cæsar, Ottoman, Ismael: in the second place are "legislatores," lawgivers; which are also called second founders, or "perpetui principes," because they govern by their ordinances after they are gone; such were Lycurgus, Solon, Justinian, Edgar, Alphonsus of Castile the Wise, that made the "Siete partidas:" in the third place are "liberatores," or "salvatores," such as compound the long miseries of civil wars, or deliver their countries from servitude of strangers or tyrants; as Augustus Cæsar, Vespasianus, Aurelianus, Theodoricus, King Henry the Seventh of England, King Henry the Fourth of France: in the fourth place are "propagatores," or "propugnatores imperii," such as in honourable wars enlarge their territories, or make noble defence against invaders; and, in the last place, are "patres patriæ," which reign justly, and make the times good wherein they live; both which last kinds need no examples, they are in such number. Degrees of honour in subjects are, first, "participes curarum," those upon whom princes do discharge the greatest weight of their affairs; their right hands, as we call them: the next are "duces belli," great leaders; such as are princes' lieutenants, and do them notable services in the wars: the third are "gratiosi," favourites; such as exceed not this scantling, to be solace to the sovereign, and harmless to the people: and the fourth, "negotiis pares;" such as have great places under princes, and execute their places with sufficiency. There is an honour, likewise, which may be ranked amongst the greatest, which happeneth rarely; that is, of such as sacrifice themselves to death or danger for the good of their country; as was M. Regulus, and the two Decii.

 

ought to remember that their office is "jus dicere," and not "jus dare," to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law; else will it be like the authority claimed by the church of Rome, which under pretext of exposition of Scripture, doth not stick to add and alter, and to pronounce that which they do not find, and by show of antiquity to introduce novelty. Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue. "Cursed (saith the law) is he that removeth the landmark." The mislayer of a mere stone is to blame; but it is the unjust judge that is the capital remover of landmarks, when he defmeth amiss of lands and property. One foul sentence doth more hurt than many foul examples; for these do but corrupt the stream, the other corrupteth the fountain; so saith Solomon, "Fons turbatus, et vena corrupta est justus cadens in causa suâ coram adversario." The office of judges may have reference unto the parties that sue, unto the advocates that plead, unto the clerks and ministers of justice underneath them, and to the sovereign or state above them.

First, for the causes or parties that sue. "There be (saith the Scripture) that turn judgment into wormwood;" and surely there be, also, that turn it into vinegar; for injustice maketh it bitter, and delays make it sour. The principal duty of a judge is, to suppress force and fraud; whereof force is the more pernicious when it is open, and fraud when it is close and disguised. Add thereto contentious suits, which ought to be spewed out, as the surfeit of courts. A judge ought to prepare his way to a just sentence, as God useth to prepare his way, by raising valleys and taking down hills: so when there appeareth on either side an high hand, violent prosecution, cunning advantages taken, combination, power, great counsel, then is the virtue of a judge seen to make inequality equal; that he may plant his judgment as upon an even ground. "Qui fortiter emungit, elicit sanguinem;" and where the winepress is hard wrought, it yields a harsh wine that tastes of the grape-stone. Judges must beware of hard constructions, and strained inferences, for there is no worse torture than the torture of laws: especially in case of laws penal, they ought to have care that that which was meant for terror be not turned into rigour; and that they bring not upon the people that shower whereof the Scripture speaketh, "Pluet super eos laqueos;" for penal laws pressed are a shower of snares upon the people; therefore let penal laws, if they have been sleepers of long, or if they be grown unfit for the present time, be by wise judges confined in the execution; "Judicis officium est, ut res, ita tempora rerum," &c. In causes of life and death, judges ought (as far as the law permitteth) in justice to remember mercy, and to cast a severe eye upon the example, but a merciful eye upon the person.

Secondly, for the advocates and counsel that plead. Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace to a judge first to find that which he might have heard in due time from the bar; or to show quickness of conceit in cutting off evidence or counsel too short, or to prevent information by questions, though pertinent. The parts of a judge in hearing are four; to direct the evidence; to moderate length, repetition, or impertinency of speech; to recapitulate, select, and collate the material points of that which hath been said, and to give the rule or sentence. Whatsoever is above these is too much, and proceedeth either of glory and willingness to speak, or of impatience to hear, or of shortness of memory, or of want of a staid and equal attention. It is a strange thing to see that the 