Page:The Wisconsin idea (IA cu31924032449252).pdf/282

 because they are believed to be peculiarly applicable to a case like the present, where a law which is framed to meet new economic conditions and difficulties resulting therefrom is attacked principally because it is believed to offend against constitutional guarantees or prohibitions couched in general terms, or supposed general policies drawn from the whole body of the instrument."

Again:—

"The next important contention is that the law is unconstitutional because it vests judicial power in a body which is not a court and is not composed of men elected by the people, in violation of those clauses of the state constitution which vest the judicial power in certain courts and provide for the election of judges by the people, as well as in violation of the constitutional guarantees of due process of law. It was suggested at the argument that the Industrial Commission might perhaps be held to be a court of conciliation, as authorized to be created by Section 16 of Article VII of the state constitution, but we do not find it necessary to consider or decide this contention. We do not consider the Industrial Commission a court, nor do we construe the act as vesting in the Commission judicial powers within the meaning of the Constitution. It is an administrative body or arm of the government which in the course of its administration of a law is empowered to ascertain some questions of fact and apply the existing law thereto, and in so doing acts quasi-judicially, but it is not thereby vested with judicial power in the constitutional sense.

"There are many such administrative bodies or commissions, and with the increasing complexity of modern government they seem likely to increase rather than diminish. Examples may be easily thought of,—town boards, boards of health, boards of review, boards of equalization, railroad rate commissions, and public