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because it showed that if they could defeat the present negotiations, the war would continue, the peace party would fall from power, and then the Eventualists would have American support in setting up a government according to their ideas. Rincón pretended to be ill. Associated with the ministry of Relaciones at this time as confidential advisers were such men as Pedraza, Lafragua and Cuevas.

10. Sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 21. 335Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 24, personal. 335 to Id., Oct. 25. 335Dimond to Id., Oct. 27. 73Lozano, no. 3, res., 1847. 335Trist, notes and memoranda. 335Notes of Trist and Couto. 335Thornton's translation of Mexican draft of treaty. 335Notes from Doyle and Thornton. (Unreasonable) México á través, iv, 706. Sierra, Evolution, i, 223. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 592, 596-7. 13Doyle, nos. 10 (with memoranda), 29, 1848. 13Palmerston to Mora, June 20, 1848. 52Trist, no. 27. Exposición dirigida, 6. (Trist's conduct) Negrete, Invasión, iv, 324.

Trist relied for guidance on his original instructions (Ho. 69; 30,  pp. 48-7), the projet of a treaty accompanying the instructions (ibid., p. 47), 52instructions of July 13 and 19, 1847, former treaties of the United States, and our general principles and policy (52Trist, no. 27). See also Polk's Diary, Apr. 13, 1847. In regard to the western end of the boundary the instructions were faulty, and Trist found it necessary to use his judgment (52enclosure in his no. 27). Greatly fearing the designs of the Monarchists, he desired to have a secret article binding upon Mexico the constitution of 1824, and was willing to promise in return that enough American troops to support the government should remain five years; but the proposition was declined (13Doyle, no. 10, 1848). There was a difficulty in doing anything about Tehuantepec, for British interests were involved, and that matter was dropped by Trist in order to facilitate the adjustment of the boundary (Exposicién, supra). It did not signify much now, for the United States had its eye upon a better route (J. S. Reeves in Amer. Hist. Rev., x, 323). The subject that consumed the most time was the status of the people of the surrendered territory (Trist, no. 27). The Mexicans asked that their civil law should continue to rule there until the territory should be organized into states, but Trist (perhaps in the interest of slavery) would not consent (13Doyle, no. 10). 11. 13Doyle, nos. 10, 12, 13, 1848. Roa Bdrcena, Recuerdos, 568, 579, 591, 602-3, 605-6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1039 (Scott). 52Trist, nos. 25-7. México á través, iv, 706-8. 335Trist to wife, Dec. 26, 1847; to Scott, Jan. 28, 1848; to commrs., Jan. 29, 1848. 13Doyle to commrs., Jan. 28-9. (S. L. P.) 88Gov. S. L. P. to gov. Querétaro, Feb. 5, 1848; 77Relaciones, circular, Jan. 17; Nacional, Jan. 26 (plan); Feb. 2; Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 41, 43; México á través, iv, 706. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 28.

Pefia became the chief executive again because the expiration of Anaya's term (ordered by the Congress that elected him to occur on Jan. 8, since it was expected that the new Congress would have assembled by that date) left the country without a head, and the position devolved upon him as chief of the supreme court. L. de la Rosa was then appointed minister of relations. The plan of the S. L. P. governor was that four states — S. L. P., Zacatecas, Guanajuato and Jalisco — should combine, repudiate the national government, and continue the war, expecting other states to join them; but public opinion, even in his own state, failed to support him. Almonte was actively working against peace at this time,