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security for its own safety (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 121). Trist was given authority to draw any part of the three millions appropriated to facilitate making a treaty. Buchanan to excuse himself wrote (52to Trist, June 14) that Scott would not have replied to Trist as he did, had he waited to see Trist's instructions. This amounted to saying that, since Scott knew nothing about those instructions, his letter was natural. Marcy admitted (May 31: Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 122) that Scott ought to have seen the instructions, the projet and Buchanan's despatch, of which Trist had a copy. Dee. 26 256Scott had written privately to Marcy that he had heard from Congressmen of a plan to place Benton over him, but did not believe a word of it; and Jan. 16 he again had expressed his gratitude and loyalty to the President. But it should not be forgotten that while the administration was entitled to full credit for its meanness and blundering, the trouble arose primarily from Scott's having gone deeply into politics. He was not politically active now. Jan. 16 he 256wrote privately to Marcy, "On setting out, on my present mission, I laid down whiggism, without taking up democracy," but the politicians were not fitted to believe this manly and truthful declaration. The Whigs insisted that Trist had been sent to embarrass and perhaps to ruin Scott.

10. Thornton, later Sir Edward Thornton, British minister to the United States, saw Scott also, who gave him to understand that he should advance against Mexico July 1 or 2 unless a reply to Buchanan's despatch should seem probable (13T. to Addington, June 29). Thornton believed that Rején was intriguing with Scott to have the Americans come to Mexico, install the Puros and make peace with them, and that Rejón's party were insisting upon war for this reason (ibid.). Baranda had tried to catch Scott in some entanglement by means of secret negotiations through the British legation, but had failed (13Bankhead, nos. 47, 54, 1847). Bankhead exerted all his influence with the government in favor of negotiations. June 22 the minister of relations replied politely to Buchanan that his despatch had been referred to Congress, with which the settlement of the matter rested (Diario, June 26).

11. Scott 335wrote to Trist, July 17, to the following effect: I concur with you, several of my generals and many foreigners of high standing here and at Mexico in believing that our occupation of twenty principal towns, besides those we already hold, probably would not within a year or more force the Mexicans to accept a peace on terms honorable to the United States without the pledge in advance or the payment of money to some of the principal authorities. This is expected as a preliminary to any negotiation. We must pay $10,000 down to one high official, and $1,000,000, probably to be divided among many, on the ratification of a treaty. With your concurrence I sent $10,000 to Mexico yesterday, and at the proper time I will unite with you in pledging $1,000,000. Ihave no question as to the morality of this course, nor have you. We have tempted the integrity of no one. The overture, if corrupt, came from parties already corrupted. We merely avail ourselves of that corruption to obtain an end highly advantageous to both countries. Such transactions have always been considered allowable in war. We do not know that this money would not go into the same channels as that which our government is willing to pay publicly for territory would go into.

June 4 Poinsett said he should be "surprised" if the Mexicans could be made to accept the terms of the United States (345to Van Buren). June 11 Buchanan said privately he should not be "much disappointed" should