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22. I. I. Stevens, one of the engineer officers, 66reporting on May 7, stated in the most distinct manner that according to this plan El Telégrafo was not to be attacked before the highway in its rear should have been occupied in strength, and that insistence upon this point constituted the essential difference between this plan and the operations previously suggested by Beauregard. Scott wrote to Marcy (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261) that he had intended to turn the Mexican position and attack in the rear He clearly indicated as much in his Memoirs (ii, 432), and his orders for the battle were that Twiggs's division, supposed to be already near the highway, should move before daybreak to occupy it, while the orders only contemplated an attack in front as likely to be made before 10 o'clock. It was well understood in the army that his plan was to bag Santa Anna's army, and this implied — since some of the Mexicans were likely to retire early — that the way of escape must be cut off before a frontal attack could be launched. Stevens tried to reach the highway via the Mexicain right, but was taken ill and had to return (Stevens, Stevens, i, 124)

23. Scott's operations, Apr. 12-16. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261 (Scott) Picayune, May 1, 2. 217Henshaw papers. A Soldier's Honor, 24 Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, p. 181. 159Narrative based on the papers of F. Collins. Scott, Mems., ii, 432. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 250. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 56-8. Davis, Autobiog., 144-8. Bishop, Journal. 322Smith, diary. 112Beauregard to Patterson, Apr. 20. 111Stevens to J. L. Smith, May 7. 111G. W. Smith to Stevens, Apr. 23 111Tower to J. L. Smith, undated. 111Mason to J. L. Smith, Apr. 24. 65Scott, gen. orders 105, 111. 332Tennery, diary. McCabe, Lee, 19, note. 12Loch to Lambert, Apr. 9. Oswandel, Notes, 113-5. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 122-4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 929 (Scott); 939 (Twiggs); 940 (Pillow)

24. The range had to be estimated (322W. B. Smith, diary), and perhaps it was not easy to rectify the estimate by seeing where the shot struck Many of them flew much too high.

25. Scott's orders for the battle gave no directions for such a charge. His plan was to place Twiggs's division and Shields's brigade, supported by Worth's command, on the highway in Santa Anna's rear and attack from that quarter. From one of his reports it appears that he made some suggestion to Twiggs about the possibility of a frontal attack on El Telégrafo — presumably in the case of some unlooked-for turn of events; but he did not expect that officer to create the turn. The charge seems to have been ordered by Scott during the night (213Hatch to father, Apr. 21) To be sure, Scott's orders spoke of a frontal attack, but evidently the reference was to Pillow's movement.

The officers of the Rifles were taken by Polk from civil life. Scott ofset this by having Major Sumner of the Second Dragoons, a veteran and able soldier, command the corps; but as Sumner had been disabled on Saturday, Major Loring was now at its head. When moving from shelter he exposed his men to being enfiladed by the enemy's cannon, and the other troops actually cried out, "That's the way to murder men" (218Henshaw) This illustrates how political appointments are likely to work on the firing line. The Rifles were expected to join in the attack on El Telégrafo after repulsing the enemy on the left, but a part of them were unable to do so (p. 352)

26. Events of Apr. 17-18 (except Pillow's operations). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 255-95, 298 (Scott's orders; reports of himself and officers). Maury,