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238 these facts could not obliterate certain others. Trist was not merely a private citizen but a discharged official under the frown of his government. Dealings with Peña could be described as traitorous. A warning against confidence in Mexican pretences and a notice that harder terms would now be exacted by the United States had been served upon him; and what those terms would be he could only imagine. Yet he fully believed in the sincerity of Peña and his associates. Thornton confirmed this opinion, and adjured him to improve the opportunity. No one on the ground could see any other way to peace. General Scott favored negotiating and probably expressed the opinion to Trist, as to Mexicans, that, should he make a treaty, it would be accepted by the United States. But on him, Nicholas P. Trist alone, it depended to say whether two nations were to be miserable or happy, to keep on cutting at each other's throats or enjoy the blessings of peace; and on him it rested to assume, should he take humanity and patriotism for guides, a most arduous task at the gravest personal risk and with no substantial profit in view. At noon on December 4 he decided aright, and it was a truly noble act.

Trist now had it intimated to the Mexican commissioners, that if they were disposed to accept a boundary line traced up the Rio Grande to thirty-two degrees of latitude and thence west, he would meet them privately to make further arrangements. The outcome was a strong recommendation from the Mexican commissioners, presented and urged by Thornton, that Peña consent. Peña did so; but he pointed out that it would be necessary to defer action until the new Senate should confirm the nomination of the commissioners. Encouraged, however, by advices from Thornton, Trist revoked his official notice that Polk had recalled him, and waited, with feelings that can be imagined, for the waters to move.

The negotiations stood in fact at a graver crisis than he thought. News that leading Whigs talked of settling with Mexico on terms far easier than Trist proposed caused hesitation at Querétaro, and fresh hopes of English assistance had a still greater effect. But fortunately Doyle arrived at this juncture to take charge of the British legation, and promptly directed Thornton to state that nothing more than good offices could be expected of his government. The support of these