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36. The Louisiana men went from Lobos Islands to Tampico. Col. De Russey and the other part of the regiment were wrecked about Feb. 6 on the coast nearly opposite those islands, but after some hardships and considerable danger of being captured by Gen. Cos, commanding at Tuxpán about forty miles distant, they made their way to Tampico, meeting en route an expedition sent to rescue them (Meade, Letters, i, 179; Lawton, Artillery Officer, 32-5; 270Moore, diary; 76F. de Garay, Mar. 5).

37. To Lobos Islands. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1256 (Hetzel); 1259 (Babbitt); 878 (Conner); 568 (Jesup); 840, 841, 846, 880, 891, 896 (Scott). 65Scott, gen. orders 1, 6, 8, Jan. 15, 30, 30. Lawton, Artillery Officer, 23, 65. 61Brooke to Munroe, Jan. 11; to Scott, Jan. 9, 21. 62Stanton to Jesup, Feb. 16. Scott, Mems., ii, 418. 298Porter, diary. 254McClellan, Feb. 23. 193Foster to mother, Feb. 26. Ho. 59; 30, 1, p. 41. Smith, To Mexico, 105, 108. 164Scott to Conner, Dec. 26, 1846. Niles, Mar. 13, p. 21; 20, p.48. Hartman, Journal, 6. Oswandel, Notes, 54-6. Picayune, Feb. 18. 159Collins, diary. 146Caswell, diary. Ballentine, English Soldier, i, 266. Bishop, Journal.

38. Polk and Marcy felt that he was looking for an issue (256Marcy to Wetmore, April 25, 1847), and his course warrants that supposition.

39. Taylor's movements. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 861, 890, 1097(Taylor), 875 (Scott). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 72, 85, 87, 180-2. 169Id. to Crittenden, Jan. 26. Polk, Diary, Oct. 20, 1846; Jan. 5; Mar. 21-23; Apr. 1, 1847. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Mar. 11. ''Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit.'' xiv, 443.

Jan. 26 Scott wrote to Taylor: 'I must ask you to abandon Saltillo, and to make no detachments, except for reconnaisances and immediate defence, much beyond Monterey. I know this to be the wish of the government, founded on reasons in which I concur" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 864). In reply Taylor wrote on Feb. 7 that he was going to remain at his advanced position unless "positively ordered to fall back by the government at Washington" (ibid., 1162). In addressing the government on the same day (ibid., 1110) he referred to Scott's instructions as advice. But such language from a superior officer was clearly an order courteously phrased, and this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that Scott deemed it necessary to give Taylor express authority later to make a diversion toward San Luis Potosí (ibid., p. 876). Polk (Diary, April 7, 1847, and elsewhere) remarked that Taylor had violated his orders by taking his advanced position.

Taylor's ostensible reasons for so doing as given by himself (Bixby coll., 182) were these: 1. It would be safest to fight, should the Mexicans advance, immediately on their getting across the desert region that lay between San Luis Potosí and the advanced American position, rather than let them recuperate and use Saltillo as a base. 2. Had the Americans fallen back to Monterey, Santa Anna would have invested it, the Mexicans of that section would have risen, every animal at Monterey would have starved or been destroyed, the troops — disheartened by retreating, and beyond succor — would have surrendered or been cut to pieces, and every American dépôt in the rear would have been abandoned or captured. 3. Doniphan would have been ruined. But (1), as we have seen (note 27), Taylor believed on Jan. 26, Feb. 4, 7, and 14 (i.e. both before and after taking the advanced position) that he was in no real danger of being attacked by Santa Anna, and hence had not the warrant of a supposed emergency for disregarding his instructions. (2) This