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for a pontoon train) on the ground that every stream between Vera Cruz and Mexico was fordable. But (1) Scott could not be sure his operations would be confined to that line; (2) he operated in fact on the lower Alvarado River, where it was not fordable; (3) had the national bridge been blown up, pontoons might have been useful there for] wagons and heavy guns. Río del Plan was a small stream, but the enemy caused the Americans much trouble by destroying the bridge at Plan del Río. See Ripley, op. cit., ii, 165.

12. The proof that Scott and the administration intended that Taylor should not be placed in jeopardy is superabundant: Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 357, 366, 389 (Marcy); 844, 1272, 1276 (Scott). Scott even intended to give Taylor his personal aid, should the Mexicans attack him in force; and this was one of his reasons for going to Camargo (ibid., 844; 61Scott to Brooke, Dec. 28).

13. As late as Jan. 2, 1847, every member of the Cabinet except Clifford was opposed to Scott’s marching against the city of Mexico, though Polk favored taking that step should it be necessary in order to obtain peace (Polk, Diary).

14. Taylor alleged bitterly (Bixby, 182) that discourtesy and injury were done him by the failure to notify him promptly of the expedition, but Polk’s precaution was wise. Some despatches were intercepted or lost, and soon a most important letter from Scott to Taylor, marked “confidential’’ both outside and within, was opened by a subordinate at Monterey and publicly discussed (Scott, Mems., ii, 402). See note 15.

15. Nov. 25 Marcy wrote guardedly to Taylor with reference to the new expedition, but the despatch went astray (62adj. gen. to Taylor, May 5, 1847). It is surprising that cipher was not used. It seems as if a ciphered letter giving the necessary explanations and ordering Taylor to place the required forces at specified points by specified dates should have, been sent to Taylor in triplicate by trusty messengers not later than Nov. 30.

16. Scott's operations, etc., up to Dec. 27. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 373, 838-41, 1218, 1268, 1270, 1273-5 (Scott); 369, 372, 873, 1231 (Marcy); 1253 (Jesup); 1100 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 95, 181. Senex, Myth. Wise, Seven Decades, 235. Polk, Diary, Nov. 10, 20, 1846; Jan. 2, 1847. Jameson, Calhoun Corres., 727-8. ''Journ. of Milit. Serv. Instit.,'' xiv, 442. 234A. Johnson to, Dec. 2. 191Fairfield to wife, Dec. 13. Scott, Mems., ii, 402. 256Id. to Marcy, Dec. 27, private. 61H. L. Scott, Nov. 24. 61W. Scott, memo., Nov. 29. 62Jones to Taylor, May 5, 1847. 164Scott to Conner, Dec. 26 (P.S. Dec. 27). Picayune, Dec. 24. “The Brazos” signified loosely a region comprising Brazos Id., Pt. Isabel, and sometimes the mouth of the Rio Grande.

Scott blamed Marcy for permitting him to spend only four days at Washington in preparatory work (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1218). Marcy replied that Scott passed twenty-six days in going from the capital to New Orleans via New York when he might have reached that place in seven (ibid., 1228). The reply looks effective but does not cover the ground. Marcy said Scott was not needed at the war department, where the initial work had to be done; and hence the General did well to fortify himself for the campaign and gain time for reflection by choosing the sea route. The voyage took nineteen days instead of twelve on account of head winds.

While he was at New Orleans a newspaper published there stated that