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figures. A Tennessee captain reported the number of killed as 200. To look at the matter more in detail, Meade (Letters, i, 165) wrote that Garland lost some 265 killed and wounded. Butler admitted his own division lost about 250. A. S. Johnston (Johnston, Johnston, 138) wrote that its loss was "perhaps many more" than that. Bliss admitted that it lost 225, killed, wounded and missing, on Sept. 21 alone (McCall, Letters, 461). Worth's loss seems to have been about 70. The Texas division lost not less than 27 (Ho. 24; 31,1). Here we get at least 612. But Garland did not have the Fourth Infantry (303 officers and men), which Bliss stated was "almost destroyed" (McCall, Letters, 461). This must mean a loss (killed and wounded) of at least one half; yet the official return was 36 (Ho. 24; 31, 1).

Taylor began the fighting with nearly 250 sick, and after three such days of excitement, fatigue and hardship, this number was probably quite 400. The guard at the camp — one company from each infantry regiment — probably amounted to at least 300, and, as some Mexican cavalry were looking for a chance to strike there, could not safely be reduced. A considerable number of men were needed to hold the captured forts, escort supplies of provisions and ammunition and perform other special services. If we call Taylor's loss 800, deduct 350 for the sick and allow 400 for guards and others detached on duty, we have about 4650 tired and considerably demoralized men (many of them horse and many without bayonets) as perhaps available for an assault.

The simple fact that Taylor himself believed he could not, in less than about six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), be in a condition to resume his advance, indicated what his situation now was. Finally, it should be mentioned, he entertained still the false idea of strategy shown at Matamoros. He only cared to get Monterey, he said, for he could beat the Mexicans at any time (Coleman, Crittenden, 309). The fact that it would cost the lives of soldiers to beat the Mexicans did not appear to signify.

13. 147Chamberlain, diary. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 82 (Taylor), 106 (Worth). 169Scott to Crittenden, Oct. 19. Delia, Feb. 14, 1847. 169Peyton to Crittenden, Oct. 2. Grant, Mems., i, 117-8. Welles papers. Griffis, Perry, 218. Smith, Chile con Carne, 97. Lane, Adventures, 42. Spirit of the Times, Nov.7. (Hardly) Ripley, War, 268-9. 76Ampudia, Sept. 28.

As Welles remarked, the people took delight in thinking and talking about the details of the fight. The capture of Monterey had no strategic bearing on the aim of the war (Scott, Mems., ii, 412). The demonstration of our fighting ability (which, however, had already been proved) had a moral value; but one may well question whether this was not fully offset by the blundering of Taylor and other officers, our losses and the terms granted to Ampudia. Many of superior intelligence in the United States criticised Taylor sharply.

 

1. Probably he did not include Wool's troops. A Mexican reported that on Oct. 14 Taylor had not over 4000 in camp near Monterey, 600 regulars in that city and 1080 men in the hospitals there, and that 600 volunteers, who had arrived Oct. 15, marched with 400 from the camp to other points. According to Gen. Patterson, commanding, there were in the Camargo region, Oct. 8, about 7000 effectives, but by Oct. 31 these numbered only 5700, viz., Second Dragoons, 150; Second Infantry and