Page:The Vedanta-sutras, with the Sri-bhashya of Ramanujacharya.djvu/40

 nature of self-luminous intelligence, it is shewn that on no supposition can the ttrahman be the seat of ' ignorance. ' This supposed avidyd therefore can have no abode to reside in (pp. 156-161.). The next difficulty in the way of the theory of mdyd is that this supposed ' ignorance ' cannot, as maintained by its upholders, conceal the Brahman whose essential nature consists entirely of luminosity ; for, the concealment of such a luminosity must mean nothing other than the destruction of the essential nature of the Brahman Himself. This difficulty is known as Tirodhdndnupapatti (page 1 6 1.). The third difficulty is called Swarupdnupapatti and deals with the essential nature of this avidyd. As long as it is a thing at all, it must either have the nature of a reality or the nature of an unreality. But it is not admitted to be a reality ; and it cannot be an unreality, for, as long as a real misguiding error, different from the Brahman Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain this theory of illusion (pp. 161- 162.). The fourth difficulty in the way of this theory of illusion is called the Anirvachaniyatwdnupapatti, and points out how it is not possible for the illusion-producing avidyd to be incapable of definition either as an entity or as a non-entity. All cognitions relate to entities or non-entities ; and if it be held that the object of a cognition has neither the positive characteristics of an entity nor the negative characteristics of a non-entity, then all things may become the objects of all cognitions (pp. 162- 163.)

Naturally the next question that is here discussed is whether there is any means by which this curious avidyd is brought within the range of our cognition ; and it is shewn that there is no means of proof by which such an avidyd can be arrived at and established, This difficulty