Page:The Theory of Moral Sentiments.pdf/422

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T was oberved in the third part of this dicoure, that the rules of jutice are the only rules of morality which are precie and accurate; that thoe of all the other virtues are looe, vague, and indeterminate; that the firt may be compared to the rules of grammar; the others to thoe which critics lay down for the attainment of what is ublime and elegant in compoition, and which preent us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to aim at, than afford us any certain and infallible directions for acquiring it.

As the different rules of morality admit uch different degrees of accuracy, thoe authors who have endeavoured to collect and diget them into ytems have done it in two different manners; and one et has followed thro' the whole that looe method to which they were naturally directed by the conideration of one pecies of virtues; while another has as univerally endeavoured to introduce into their precepts that ort of accuracy of which only ome of them are uceptible. The firt have wrote like critics, the econd like grammarians. I. The