Page:The Supreme Court in United States History vol 1.djvu/50

24 ment has been the voluntary lunitation upon the exer- cise of its own power which the Court has adopted as a rule of practice. This limitation which, as a recent Judge has said, "is more than a canon of interpreta- tion, it is a rule of conduct resting upon considerations of public policy'*, was first set forth by Judge Iredell in 1798, when he stated that, as the authority to de- clare a statute void "is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case/* ^ This rule, it is to be noted, was first applied only to State statutes, as a means of avoiding friction between the States and the Federal Government. "It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity and the patriotism of the Legisla- tive body by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the Constitu- tion is proved beyond all reasonable doubt," said Judge Washington in 1827, and Judge Woodbury said in 1848: "It is to be recollected that our Legislatures stand in. a position demanding often the most favor- able construction for their motives in passing laws,

1 Moody, J., in Employers' LiabUity Cases (1906), 207 U. S. 463, 500. James Iredell even before he became a Judge oi the Court had written, as early as Aug. 26, 1787, to Richard D. Spaight stating that : "In all doubtful cases to be sure, the Act ought to be supported. It should be unconstitutional beyond dispute before it is pronounced such.** Iredell, J., in Colder v. Bttll (1798), 3 Dallas, 886, 399; Paterson, J., in Cooper v. Telfair (1800), 4 DaUas, 14, 19; Marshall, C. J., in Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 6 Cranch, 87, 128; and Dartmouth College y. Woodward ' (1819), 4 Wheat. 518, 625 ; Washington, J., in Ogden y. Saunders (1827), 12 Wheat. 213, 270; Woodbury. J., in Planters Bank v. Sharp (1848), 6 How. 801. "Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt.** Strong, J., in Legal Tender Cases (1871). 12 Wall. 457, 521 ; Waite, C. J., in Sinking Fund Cases (1879), 99 U. S. 700, 718. See also Peckham, J., in Nicol v. Ames (1899), 173 U. S. 509, 515 ; Day, J., in El Paso, etc, Ry. v. Outierez (1909), 215 U. S. 87, 96. Other Judges have used similar phrases to express the Court's rule oi conduct. '* As the State tribunals are presumed to do their duty, we should not disturb their dedsion, even on matters connected with the General Government, unless very manifestly improper or erroneous." Woodbury, J., in Doe v. Eslaioa (1850), 9 How. 421, 444. The incompatibility "must be clear and strong.*' Harlan, J., in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson (1894). 154 U. S. 447; Brewer, J., in Fairbank v. United States (1901), 181 U. S. 283, 285.