Page:The Spirit of Russia by T G Masaryk, volume 2.pdf/561

Rh Since the days of Bělinskii and Herzen, for Russian thinkers the ethical problem of revolution has been the question whether crime and murder are permissible. Ropšin became aware that as a revolutionary he had not merely to sacrifice his own life, but to slay others, and he asked himself, May one kill? Such is the real problem of conscience, and the question can only be answered in the negative. Man cannot play the part of God towards his fellows. In accordance with humanitarian ethics, all human life without distinction is sacred. There are no exceptions to the humanitarian law that no man has the right to kill his fellow man. The law is, of course, equally binding on rulers.

A further canon of humanitarian ethics is that everyone may, nay must, defend himself against anything that imperils his mental or physical life, and that he ought to do so in all circumstances, and whatever the source of the menace. Everyone should resist coercion and constraint. Tolstoi's doctrine of non-resistance is false. The only element of truth it contains is that the defender must confine himself to defence; the aggressor's violence does not justify the use of active violence in return. Humanitarian ethics does not appraise slaying in accordance with the Old Testament law of retaliation. The essence of moral progress is that the psychological motivation of every action demands individual consideration, so that every act of killing must be judged according to the attendant circumstances. To-day, not every killing is punishable with death; jurists distinguish between death and manslaughter, and legally there are varying degrees of murder.

The humanitarian standard must be applied in our judgment of revolution, and of revolutionary killing. Socio-political self-defence, defence of one's own and others' lives, the defence of the general weal and above all of moral and spiritual interests against the violence of rulers, are permissible and are indeed positive duties. Experience has shown that theocratic aristocracy in its absolutist form is essentially coercive, and is prone to the use of force; hence the resistance offered by the democracy is fully justified. Revolution may be a right and necessary means of resistance, and is then ethically justified. It may even become a moral duty.

My contention is, that revolution may be the right instrument for the democracy to adopt. It may be. But some