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HE final outcome of theocratic policy and of the reaction under Alexander I and Nicholas I was the downfall of Sevastopol. Six years after the overthrow of the revolution in Hungary, Russia's sometime associates in the holy alliance made common cause with Turkey, which Alexander had desired to destroy.

It is not difficult to understand the effect which the Crimean defeat exercised upon theocratic power, an effect resembling that caused upon medieval minds by the failure of the crusades. Just as in earlier days Christians and Christianity had proved too weak to conquer their hereditary enemies, so now were Russian theocracy, Russian Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationalism, compelled to capitulate to "degenerate Europe."

Orthodoxy, the essential basis of theocracy, was, indeed, in evil case if judged by its power over the Orthodox emperor-pope. Nicholas, like his brother Alexander, failed to fiind adequate consolation in the official creed. We learn from the testimony of his physicians that he harboured thoughts of suicide, and although he did not carry these into effect, during his last illness he hastened the end by thwarting medical assistance. His courtiers, who were playing cards when informed of his death, continued their game undisturbed.

No more in life than in death did Nicholas find moral help in his state church and its religion—unless we are to regard his cruelty and despotism as Christian manifestations. Was his private life Christian? Was his relationship to his mistress Nelidov, Christian? What are we to think of his confiscation of the estates and castles of the Polish aristocracy?

By the collapse of their traditional diplomacy and militarism, aristocratic, officialdom and the court, hitherto content with veneer, were compelled to devote serious attention to internal affairs. What happened to absolutist Austria in 1859 and 1866, what happened to France in 1870 and 1871, happened now to Russia. The defeat at Sevastopol resulted from the bad equipment of the army, and from defects in leadership and military training. Russia's enemies were provided with modern artillery and small arms against the obsolete weapons of the Russians. The range of the Russian rifles was from 300 to 450 paces, that of the European rifles was 1,200 paces. The