Page:The Russian Review Volume 1.djvu/90

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Alexander III. married a Danish princess, the present Dowager Empress, a clever and energetic woman, who will never forgive Prussia the shameless robbery of her country in 1864. That robbery by two mighty Empires of one of the smallest kingdoms in existence was so adroitly manipulated by Bismarck, that Europe passively countenanced the act, making the initial blunder which created modern Germany and led to this War. It is generally considered that the Dowager Empress was the chief cause of Alexander's anti-German feelings and of the creation of the Franco-Russian Entente. Both were, however, purely platonic, and did not greatly disturb Germany, especially as the Germans still remained all-powerful in the Russian state service. The nationalistic tendencies did not go beyond changes in military uniforms, and similar details.

It is the common belief in Russia that Alexander III., on his death-bed, exacted a solemn promise from his son to preserve autocracy at all cost, and, for its sake, to avoid an open break with Germany. On the other hand, it is a record of history that one of Bismarck's strongest convictions was the necessity for Germany to maintain peace with Russia, because common fundamental interests of monarchism in both countries demanded this. Permanent peace seemed to be assured, especially as Germany, up to the time of her ultimatum of July 31st, 1914, remained strictly loyal to the interests of autocracy in Russia, and conserved the sympathies of all ultra-reactionary elements. But Russia is a great state whose enormous territory and one hundred and eighty millions of people have other and more vital interests. Germany, during the last quarter of a century, constantly and deliberately harmed these interests, political and economic, until the pressure was overdone, and these interests reasserted themselves.

Nothing retards Russia's political and economic growth so much as her lack of a free outlet to the open seas. Her geographical position on the map of the world is most unfortunate and has no parallel. Practically all her wars since the beginning of the eighteenth century came about under the compulsion of the search for such an outlet. England fancied danger to her East Indian possessions if the Dardanelles were open to Russia, and for over a century protected Turkey. The ghosts of both Pitts, and of Palmerston and Beaconsfield, are certainly turning in their graves if they can sense the fact that to-day a British fleet and army are battling hard to open the Dardanelles for Russia. Only lately did English statesmen realize that it was a mistake to deny Russia her legitimate demands, but when a rapprochement came and England withdrew her support of Turkey, Germany quickly seized the opportunity, planted herself in Constantinople, and erected even a stronger bar against Russia's desires. Few people in America realize what a tremendous shock to Russia's most cherished ambition was the acquisition by Germany of complete control over Turkey's affairs, and especially the appointment of German generals to command the Turkish army. Yet Russia