Page:The Russian Review Volume 1.djvu/74

58 the first place, the German army is built on the basis of powerful units,—the regiments. Each regiment is recognized as having its own traditions and forming a compact body, which, in action, resembles a mailed fist. In order to achieve this result, it is necessary to fill the ranks of each regiment just as soon as they become thinned out, and to continue pouring into its ranks new material, which becomes rapidly assimilated. Thus, although there may remain very little of the original regiment, the spirit of the particular regiment never changes. It always remains a unit, acting as one body. Certain parts of the reserves are used, not for the formation of new regiments, but exclusively for filling in the old regiments that have lost men in battle.

The German plans of battles are wonderful for their accuracy and precision of execution. The division and corps commanders are like musicians in a well-trained orchestra. They appear on the scene of action at the precise moment when the score requires it. At times, of course, they suffer setbacks, or meet with resistance that makes absolute perfection impossible. But the organization of the German armies is such that the retreat, unless cut off, which happens very rarely, is executed very rapidly, as they possess excellent facilities for moving back their artillery. The retreat of the troops, unencumbered by artillery, is a matter of no great difficulty. This explains why there are so few German prisoners of war in Russia, as compared with the Austrians captured.

The Germans prefer to fight on a curved front. They do not send single regiments into action and rely on their rapid succession for success. Instead, their troops move in masses, which, immediately upon striking the enemy, begin to unfold their wings. As the main mass moves forward, the wings aim to accelerate their pace somewhat, thus producing a double enveloping movement, which is often irresistible. In the battle of Lodz, the Russians imitated this method by following out the German enveloping wings, and, in turn, enveloping them. The result was a Russian victory. Such a movement, however, was possible because of superiority in numbers, coupled with efficient artillery fire.

This movement of mass formation is one of the lessons that the Germans learned from Napoleon and applied to the needs of modern warfare. Like the great Corsican, the modern German strategists believe in the effectiveness of concentrated artillery fire. Their infantry is rarely used for direct attack. It is sent into action only after the artillery fire has prepared