Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/98

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 684.  From early July, security was seen in Whitehall as the key concern and was raised by Mr Blair with President Bush.

685.  A circular analysis began to develop, in which progress on reconstruction required security to be improved, and improved security required the consent generated by reconstruction activity. Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments), reported “a decline in Iraqi consent to the Coalition in MND(SE) due to the failure by the Coalition to deliver improvements in essential services” and that Shia leaders were warning of a short grace period before further significant deterioration.

686.  By the autumn of 2003, violence was escalating in Baghdad and attacks were becoming more sophisticated. Attacks on the UN in August and September, which injured and killed a number of UN officials including the UN Special Representative for Iraq, prompted some organisations to withdraw their international staff. Although Basra was less turbulent than the capital, the risk of a ripple effect from Baghdad – as identified by Gen Jackson in May – remained.

687.  The JIC assessed on 3 September that the security environment would probably worsen over the year ahead. There had been a number of serious attacks on the Coalition in MND(SE), and Islamic “extremists/terrorists” were expected to remain a long‑term threat in Iraq. The UK’s military and civilian representatives on the ground were reporting a growing insurgency in central Iraq.

688.  Despite that evidence, military planning under the leadership of General Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff, proceeded on the basis that the situation in Basra would remain relatively benign.

689.  The Inquiry considers that a deterioration in security could and should have been identified by Lt Gen Reith by the end of August 2003 and that the cumulative evidence of a deteriorating security situation should have led him to conclude that the underlying assumptions on which the UK’s Iraq campaign was based was over‑optimistic, and to instigate a review of the scale of the UK’s military effort in Iraq.

690.  There were a number of issues that might have been examined by such a review, including:

691.  No such review took place. Rh