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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 634.  Mr Blair did not:

635.  In the weeks immediately following the invasion, Mr Blair’s omissions made it more difficult for the UK Government to take an informed decision on the establishment of the UK’s post‑conflict Area of Responsibility (AOR) in southern Iraq (addressed in more detail in Section 8).

636.  In the short to medium term, his omissions increased the risk that the UK would be unable to respond to the unexpected in Iraq.

637.  In the longer term, they reduced the likelihood of achieving the UK’s strategic objectives in Iraq.

Occupation

LOOTING IN BASRA

638.  As described in Section 8, UK forces entered Basra City on the night of 6/7 April 2003 and rapidly gained control, meeting less resistance than anticipated. Once the city was under its control, the UK was responsible, as the Occupying Power, for maintenance of law and order. Within its predominantly Shia Area of Operations, the UK assumed that risks to Coalition Forces would be lower than in the so‑called “Sunni triangle” controlled by the US. Rh