Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/88

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

627.  Mr Blair told the Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 2003 that “the ‘Issue’ was aftermath – the Coalition must prevent anarchy and internecine fighting breaking out”.

628.  In his evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee on 21 January 2003, Mr Blair emphasised the importance of the post‑conflict phase:

629.  On 24 January 2003, Mr Blair told President Bush that the biggest risk they faced was internecine fighting, and that delay would allow time for working up more coherent post‑conflict plans.

630.  Yet when Mr Blair set out the UK’s vision for the future of Iraq in the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, no assessment had been made of whether that vision was achievable, no agreement had been reached with the US on a workable post‑conflict plan, UN authorisation had not yet been secured, and there had been no decision on the UN’s role in post‑conflict Iraq. Rh