Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/84

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry if the UK failed to persuade the US, it risked “being drawn into a huge commitment of UK resources for a highly complex task of administration and law and order for an uncertain period”.

598.  By March 2003, having failed to persuade the US of the advantages of a UN‑led interim administration, the UK had set the less ambitious goal of persuading the US to accept UN authorisation of a Coalition‑led interim administration and an international presence that would include the UN.

599.  On 19 March, Mr Blair stated in Parliament that discussions were taking place with the US, UN and others on the role of the UN and post‑conflict issues.

600.  Discussions continued, but, as the invasion began:

601.  Despite being aware of the shortcomings of the US plan, strong US resistance to a leading role for the UN, indications that the UN did not want the administration of Iraq to become its responsibility and a warning about the tainted image of the UN in Iraq, at no stage did the UK Government formally consider other policy options, including the possibility of making participation in military action conditional on a satisfactory plan for the post‑conflict period, or how to mitigate the known risk that the UK could find itself drawn into a “huge commitment of UK resources” for which no contingency preparations had been made. Rh