Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/83

Executive Summary 591.  It showed that, in order to achieve the UK’s desired end state, any post‑conflict administration would need to:

592.  In December 2002, the MOD described the post‑conflict phase of operations as “strategically decisive”. But when the invasion began, the UK Government was not in a position to conclude that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and preparations made to meet known post‑conflict challenges and risks in Iraq and to mitigate the risk of strategic failure.

593.  Throughout the planning process, the UK assumed that the US would be responsible for preparing the post‑conflict plan, that post‑conflict activity would be authorised by the UN Security Council, that agreement would be reached on a significant post‑conflict role for the UN and that international partners would step forward to share the post‑conflict burden.

594.  On that basis, the UK planned to reduce its military contribution in Iraq to medium scale within four months of the start of the invasion and expected not to have to make a substantial commitment to post‑conflict administration.

595.  Achieving that outcome depended on the UK’s ability to persuade the US of the merits of a significant post‑conflict role for the UN.

596.  The UK could not be certain at any stage in the year before the invasion that it would succeed in that aim.

597.  In January 2003, the UK sought to persuade the US of the benefits of UN leadership of Iraq’s interim post‑conflict civil administration. Officials warned that, Rh