Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/82

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 580.  The announcement of the Hutton Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly on 18 July, reinforced the Government’s position that additional reviews were not needed.

581.  The Government maintained that position until January 2004, backed by three votes in the House of Commons (on 4 June, 15 July and 22 October 2003) rejecting a succession of Opposition motions calling for an independent inquiry into the use of pre‑war intelligence.

582.  Mr Blair’s initial response to growing criticism of the failure to find WMD was to counsel patience.

583.  After the publication of the ISG Interim Report, the Government’s focus shifted from finding stockpiles of weapons to emphasising evidence of the Iraqi regime’s strategic intent.

584.  Once President Bush made clear his decision to set up an independent inquiry, Mr Blair’s resistance to a public inquiry became untenable.

585.  After the announcement of the Butler Review, the UK Government’s focus shifted to the content of the next ISG report, the Status Report.

586.  The Government, still concerned about the nature of the public debate on WMD in the UK, sought to ensure that the Status Report included existing ISG material highlighting the strategic intentions of Saddam Hussein’s regime and breaches of Security Council resolutions.

587.  Mr Blair remained concerned about continuing public and Parliamentary criticism of the pre‑conflict intelligence, the failure to find WMD and the decision to invade Iraq. After the reports from the Hutton Inquiry, the ISG and the US Commission, he sought to demonstrate that, although “the exact basis for action was not as we thought”, the invasion had still been justified.

588.  The ISG’s findings were significant, but did not support past statements by the UK and US Governments, which had focused on Iraq’s current capabilities and an urgent and growing threat.

589.  The explanation for military action put forward by Mr Blair in October 2004 was not the one given before the conflict.

The failure to plan or prepare for known risks

590.  The information on Iraq available to the UK Government before the invasion provided a clear indication of the potential scale of the post‑conflict task. Rh