Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/73

Executive Summary 493.  Lord Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice which fully reflected the position on 17 March, explained the legal basis on which the UK could take military action and set out the risks of legal challenge.

494.  The advice should have addressed the significance of the exchange of letters of 14 and 15 March and how, in the absence of agreement from the majority of members of the Security Council, the point had been reached that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441.

495.  The advice should have been provided to Ministers and senior officials whose responsibilities were directly engaged and should have been made available to Cabinet.

Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002

496.  The ingrained belief that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible enhance its capabilities, including at some point in the future a nuclear capability, and was pursuing an active policy of deception and concealment, had underpinned UK policy towards Iraq since the Gulf Conflict ended in 1991.

497.  While the detail of individual JIC Assessments on Iraq varied, this core construct remained in place.

498.  Security Council resolutions adopted since 1991 demanded Iraq’s disarmament and the re-admission of inspectors, and imposed sanctions in the absence of Iraqi compliance with those – and other – obligations. Agreement to those resolutions indicated that doubts about whether Iraq had disarmed were widely shared.

499.  In parallel, by 2000, the wider risk of proliferation was regarded as a major threat. There was heightened concern about:

•	the danger of proliferation, particularly that countries of concern might obtain nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; and

•	the potential risk that terrorist groups which were willing to use them might gain access to chemical and biological agents and, possibly, nuclear material, and the means to deliver them.

500.  These concerns were reinforced after 9/11.

501.  The view conveyed in JIC Assessments between December 2000 and March 2002 was that, despite the considerable achievements of UNSCOM and the IAEA between 1991 and December 1998, including dismantling Iraq’s nuclear programme, Rh