Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/71

Executive Summary

473.  Mr Rycroft replied to Mr Brummell on 15 March:

474.  It is unclear what specific grounds Mr Blair relied upon in reaching his view.

475.  In his advice of 7 March, Lord Goldsmith had said that the views of UNMOVIC and the IAEA would be highly significant in demonstrating hard evidence of non‑compliance and non‑co‑operation. In the exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March between Mr Brummell and No.10, there is no reference to their views; the only view referred to was that of Mr Blair.

476.  Following receipt of Mr Brummell’s letter of 14 March, Mr Blair neither requested nor received considered advice addressing the evidence on which he expressed his “unequivocal view” that Iraq was “in further material breach of its obligations”.

477.  Senior Ministers should have considered the question posed in Mr Brummell’s letter of 14 March, either in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee or a “War Cabinet”, on the basis of formal advice. Such a Committee should then have reported its conclusions to Cabinet before its members were asked to endorse the Government’s policy.

Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003

478.  In Parliament during the second week of March, and in the media, there were calls on the Government to make a statement about its legal position.

479.  When Lord Goldsmith spoke to Mr Brummell on 13 March, they agreed that a statement should be prepared “setting out the Attorney’s view of the legal position which could be deployed at Cabinet and in Parliament the following week”.

480.  The message was conveyed to No. 10 during the morning of 15 March that Lord Goldsmith “would make clear during the course of the week that there is a sound legal basis for action should that prove necessary”. Rh