Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/66

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 427.  It would neither be necessary nor feasible to seek a mandate from Cabinet at each stage of a discussion. That reinforces the importance of ensuring Cabinet is kept informed as strategy evolves, is given the opportunity to raise questions and is asked to endorse key decisions. Cabinet Ministers need more information than will be available from the media, especially on sensitive issues of foreign and security policy.

428.  In 2009, three former Cabinet Secretaries told the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution:

429.  Lord Turnbull told the Inquiry that Mr Blair:

430.  The responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary to ensure that members of Cabinet are fully engaged in ways that allow them to accept collective responsibility and to meet their departmental obligations nevertheless remains.

431.  The Inquiry has reviewed the debate that took place within the Government and how it reached its decision.

432.  The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from satisfactory.

433.  It was not until 13 March 2003 that Lord Goldsmith advised that there was, on balance, a secure legal basis for military action. Rh