Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/65

Executive Summary 419.  Cabinet on 17 March 2003 noted Mr Blair’s conclusion that “the diplomatic process was at an end; Saddam Hussein would be given an ultimatum to leave Iraq; and the House of Commons would be asked to endorse the use of military action against Iraq to enforce compliance, if necessary”.

420.  In Section 5 of the Report, the Inquiry concludes that Lord Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice which fully reflected the position on 17 March and explained the legal basis on which the UK could take military action and set out the risks of legal challenge.

421.  There was no substantive discussion of the military options, despite promises by Mr Blair, before the meeting on 17 March.

422.  In his statement for the Inquiry, Mr Hoon wrote that by the time he joined Cabinet, in 1999:

423.  Mr Hoon wrote:

424.  The Inquiry recognises that there will be operational constraints on discussion of the details of military deployments, but that would not preclude the discussion of the principles and the implications of military options.

425.  In January 2006, the Cabinet discussed the proposal to deploy military forces to Helmand later that year.

426.  The Inquiry also recognises that the nature of foreign policy, as the Report vividly demonstrates, requires the Prime Minister of the UK, the Foreign Secretary and their most senior officials to be involved in negotiating and agreeing policy on a day‑by‑day, and sometimes hour‑by‑hour basis. Rh