Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/60

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 396.  Similarly, Lord Wilson stated that, between 11 September 2001 and January 2002, the Government’s response to international terrorism and the subsequent military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan had been managed through 46 Ministerial meetings.

397.  The last meeting of DOP on Iraq before the 2003 conflict, however, took place in March 1999.

398.  In April 2002, the MOD clearly expected consideration of military options to be addressed through DOP. Mr Simon Webb, the MOD Policy Director, advised Mr Hoon that:

399.  Most decisions on Iraq pre‑conflict were taken either bilaterally between Mr Blair and the relevant Secretary of State or in meetings between Mr Blair, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, with No.10 officials and, as appropriate, Mr John Scarlett (Chairman of the JIC), Sir Richard Dearlove and Adm Boyce. Some of those meetings were minuted; some were not.

400.  As the guidance for the Cabinet Secretariat makes clear, the purpose of the minute of a meeting is to set out the conclusions reached so that those who have to take action know precisely what to do; the second purpose is to “give the reasons why the conclusions were reached”.

401.  Lord Turnbull, Cabinet Secretary from 2002 to 2005, described Mr Blair’s characteristic way of working with his Cabinet colleagues as:

402.  Lord Turnbull subsequently told the Inquiry that the group described above was “a professional forum ... they had ... with one possible exception [Ms Clare Short, the International Development Secretary], the right people in the room. It wasn’t the kind of sofa government in the sense of the Prime Minister and his special advisers and political cronies”. Rh