Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/50

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 330. Intelligence and assessments were used to prepare material to be used to support Government statements in a way which conveyed certainty without acknowledging the limitations of the intelligence.

331.  Mr Blair’s statement to the House of Commons on 18 March was the culmination of a series of public statements and interviews setting out the urgent need for the international community to act to bring about Iraq’s disarmament in accordance with those resolutions, dating back to February 2002, before his meeting with President Bush at Crawford on 5 and 6 April.

332.  As Mr Cook’s resignation statement on 17 March made clear, it was possible for a Minister to draw different conclusions from the same information.

333.  Mr Cook set out his doubts about Saddam Hussein’s ability to deliver a strategic attack and the degree to which Iraq posed a “clear and present danger” to the UK. The points Mr Cook made included:

334.  On 12 October 2004, announcing the withdrawal of two lines of intelligence reporting which had contributed to the pre‑conflict judgements on mobile biological production facilities and the regime’s intentions, Mr Straw stated that he did: