Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/48

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 316.  Sir Richard Dearlove told the Inquiry:

317.  The JIC assessed that Iraq was likely to mount a terrorist attack only in response to military action and if the existence of the regime was threatened.

318.  The JIC Assessment of 10 October 2002 stated that Saddam Hussein’s “overriding objective” was to “avoid a US attack that would threaten his regime”. The JIC judged that, in the event of US‑led military action against Iraq, Saddam would:

319.  The JIC also judged that:

320.  The JIC Assessment of 29 January 2003 sustained its earlier judgements on Iraq’s ability and intent to conduct terrorist operations.

321.  Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Co‑ordinator in the Cabinet Office from 2002 to 2005, told the Inquiry that, in March 2002, the Security Service judged that the “threat from terrorism from Saddam’s own intelligence apparatus in the event of an intervention in Iraq ... was judged to be limited and containable”.

322.  Baroness Manningham‑Buller, the Director General of the Security Service from 2002 to 2007, confirmed that position, stating that the Security Service felt there was “a pretty good intelligence picture of a threat from Iraq within the UK and to British interests”.