Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/47

Executive Summary

311.  The UK Government did have significant concerns about the potential risks of all types of weapons of mass destruction being obtained by Islamist extremists (in particular Al Qaida) who would be prepared to use such weapons.

312.  Saddam Hussein’s regime had the potential to proliferate material and know‑how, to terrorist groups, but it was not judged likely to do so.

313.  On 28 November 2001, the JIC assessed that:

314.  On 29 January 2003, the JIC assessed that, despite the presence of terrorists in Iraq “with links to Al Qaida”, there was “no intelligence of current co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida”.

315.  On 10 February 2003, the JIC judged that Al Qaida would “not carry out attacks under Iraqi direction”.