Page:The Report of the Iraq Inquiry - Executive Summary.pdf/42

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 275. In his memoir, Mr Blair wrote:

276. At “about 3.15pm UK time” on 17 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock announced that the resolution would not be put to a vote, stating that the co‑sponsors reserved the right to take their own steps to secure the disarmament of Iraq.

277. The subsequent discussion in the Council suggested that only the UK, the US, and Spain took the view that all options other than the use of military force had been exhausted.

278. A specially convened Cabinet at 1600 on 17 March 2003 endorsed the decision that the diplomatic process was now at an end and Saddam Hussein should be given an ultimatum to leave Iraq; and that the House of Commons would be asked to endorse the use of military action against Iraq to enforce compliance, if necessary.

279. In his statement to the House of Commons that evening, Mr Straw said that the Government had reluctantly concluded that France’s actions had put a consensus in the Security Council on a further resolution “beyond reach”.

280. As a result of Saddam Hussein’s persistent refusal to meet the UN’s demands, the Cabinet had decided to ask the House of Commons to support the UK’s participation in military action, should that be necessary to achieve the disarmament of Iraq “and thereby the maintenance of the authority of the United Nations”.

281. Mr Straw stated that Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer “set out the legal basis for the use of force”.

282. Mr Straw drew attention to the significance of the fact that no one “in discussions in the Security Council and outside” had claimed that Iraq was in full compliance with its obligations.

283. In a statement later that evening, Mr Robin Cook, the Leader of the House of Commons, set out his doubts about the degree to which Saddam Hussein posed a Rh